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Abstract 
The Idaho National Laboratory, along with Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Idaho State University’s 
Idaho Accelerator Center, are developing electron accelerator-based, photonuclear inspection technologies for 
the detection of shielded nuclear material within air-, rail-, and especially, maritime-cargo transportation 
containers. This paper describes a developing prototypical cargo container inspection system utilizing the 
Pulsed Photonuclear Assessment (PPA) technology, incorporates interchangeable, well-defined, contraband 
shielding structures (i.e., “calibration” pallets) providing realistic detection data for induced radiation 
signatures from smuggled nuclear material, and provides various shielded nuclear material detection results.  
Using a 4.8-kg quantity of depleted uranium, neutron and gamma-ray detection responses are presented for 
well-defined shielded and unshielded configurations evaluated in a selected cargo container inspection 
configuration.  © 2001 Elsevier Science. All rights reserved 
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21. Introduction 
The Idaho National Laboratory (INL), along 
with Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and 
Idaho State University’s Idaho Accelerator Center 
(ISU/IAC), has been developing a high energy 
photon interrogation system for non-intrusive 
inspections of air-, rail-, and maritime cargo 
containers [1, 2].  This energetic photon inspection 
technology is referred to as the Pulsed Photonuclear 
Assessment (PPA) technology and is supported by 
the Department of Homeland Security.  The PPA 
technology development is addressing one of our 
homeland security’s most important concerns – 
terrorism associated with the transportation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), specifically 
weapons employing nuclear materials, such as 
highly enriched uranium (HEU).  While all aspects 
of cargo container transportation and security is 
important, the focus of this paper is with shielded 
nuclear material detection in maritime cargo 
containers (or trucks) since these represent the most 
common mode of commercial transportation. This 
paper briefly describes the prototype PPA 
inspection system and then presents detection 
results from a selected cargo container inspection 
configuration.  The photonuclear-induced, radiation 
signatures are presented for a nominal 10-MeV 
photon interrogation of a 4.8-kg depleted uranium 
(DU) sample that is located within well-defined 
shielding configurations (i.e., INL “calibration” 
pallets) that are then positioned in the center of the 
inspected cargo container.  This center-positioned 
DU, and/or the “calibration” pallet, provides 
relatively challenging detection scenarios because it 
results in the largest DU-to-detector distances. 
2. Inspection technology 
The PPA inspection technology uses pulsed, 
energetic photons to induce photofissions (and 
neutron-induced fissions) in shielded nuclear 
materials.  The main features of the PPA inspection 
system include a pulsed electron accelerator (the 
photon source), a neutron and gamma-ray detection 
system [1,2], and an inexpensive gray scale 
mapping system for cargo loading characterizations 
[2]. Note, the PPA “mapping” component will not 
be discussed in this paper. 
The pulsed photon source for the PPA prototype 
is the INL Varitron [3].  The Varitron is a mobile 
accelerator system capable of generating electron 
pulses of 2-12 MeV electrons at rates up to 1 kHz 
with an on-board, electron beam current and energy 
monitoring capability.  All signature emission data 
presented in this paper are provided with a nominal 
10-MeV, 125-Hz operation producing about 3-4 PA
(avg.) beam current.   
The prototype neutron and gamma-ray detection 
system consists of a transportable stand consisting 
of an array of nine detector pairs at various 
elevations.  Each collocated pair consist a neutron 
and gamma-ray detector.  Figure 1 shows a detector 
assembly positioned along side a maritime-cargo 
container in a testing device at the IAC that 
provides container motion. 
Neutron detection is accomplished with the 
patent-pending Photonuclear Neutron Detector 
(PND) design [1] that operates within intense 
pulsed, photon-flash environments and 
differentiates prompt and delayed fission neutrons 
emissions between every accelerator pulse.  The 
unique PND design allows for the detection of 0.1-
keV to 1.0-MeV neutron since this energy range is 
representative of almost all delayed fission neutron 
emissions.   
Figure 1.  Deployed PPA detector assembly. 
Gamma-ray detection is accomplished with the 
use of standard, 1.6-cm, 27.3-cm Geiger-Müller 
tubes (model LND 719) collocated with each PND.  
A figure-of-merit (FOM)-type parameter is used to 
3characterize the induced-gamma-ray emissions.  
This FOM is a ratio of the time-dependent 
responses of a GM tube and the thermal neutrons in 
a bare helium-3 tube.  
3. Inspection configuration 
The selected PPA inspection configuration for 
the maritime-cargo container assessment is shown 
in Figures 2 and 3.  This configuration was selected 
to keep each detector assembly axis perpendicular 
to long axis of the cargo container and to allow an 
angular alignment between the accelerator beam 
axis and the detector assembly axis.  For this 
inspection evaluation, an angle of about 42-degrees 
is selected with a 250-cm standoff distance from the 
photon source to the center of the cargo container.  
As shown in Figure 3, the interrogating photon 
beam axis is 1.22-cm from the ground level.  
Figure 2.  Top view of the cargo container inspection configuration.
Figure 3.  End view of the cargo container inspection configuration. 
44. “Calibration” Pallets 
To characterize the radiation shielding effects 
from a cargo container, a set of well-defined cargo 
loadings have been assembled [2].  This 
representative set of cargo loadings is referred to as 
the INL “Calibration” Pallets.  Table 1 summarizes 
some key characteristics of these “Calibration” 
Pallet designs. 
Table 1. Calibration Pallet Designs 
Pallets Mass 
(kg) 
Primary 
Material 
Material 
Density 
(g/cc) 
Empty 46 Aluminium 2.70 
Celotex 90 “Celotex” 0.05 
Borated 
Polyethylene 
1012 5%-Borated 
polyethylene 
1.05 
Polyethylene 923 Polyethylene 0.95 
Wood 482 Plywood 0.48 
Lead 254 Lead 10.80 
Iron 890 Iron 7.80 
All pallet designs provide shielding completely 
around a centrally located nuclear material.  The 
Wood, Celotex, Borated Polyethylene, and 
Polyethylene Pallets are rectangular in shape and 
have a 1.07-m depth, a 0.86-m width, and a 1.02-m 
height.  The Lead and Iron Pallets are cylindrical in 
shape and have radial shield thickness of 5.08 and 
20.32-cm, respectively.  When the rectangular-
shaped pallets are placed within a cargo container, 
they are aligned with their long (depth) dimension 
parallel with the long container axis.  This 
alignment allows a standard two-wide, two-high 
pallet loading in the cargo container. 
5. Results 
Tests were performed with (and without) a 4.8-
kg, ~14-cm square DU sample in each of the INL 
“Calibration” Pallets located at the center of the 
cargo container configuration as indicated in 
Figures 2 and 3.  All tests involved a 120-s data 
acquisition. 
Table 2 presents the neutron detection response 
at detector positions #3 and #16 while Table 3 
presents gamma-ray FOM parameter data from all 
gamma-ray detector positions.  Shaded (or orange) 
table entries represent nuclear material detection 
based on the following threshold settings: 4E-14 
neutron counts/e and a FOM=14.   
Table 2.  Selected neutron detection responses.  
Neutron Counts/Electron (120 s inspection) 
Detector #3 Detector #16 
Pallets 
No DU With DU No DU With DU 
Empty 2.30±0.29 E-14 9.97±0.19 E-13 2.31±0.29 E-14 5.62±0.14 E-13 
Celotex 1.88±0.26 E-14 9.11±0.18 E-13 2.46±0.28 E-14 8.44±0.17 E-13 
Borated 
Polyethylene 
1.94±0.30 E-14 2.06±0.31 E-14 2.03±0.31 E-14 1.84±0.29 E-14 
Polyethylene 2.61±0.35 E-14 1.97±0.29 E-14 2.83±0.35 E-14 1.99±0.29 E-14 
Wood 2.56±0.31 E-14 5.95±0.48 E-14 1.89±0.26 E-14 6.86±0.51 E-14 
Lead 2.57±0.34 E-14 1.08±0.07 E-13 3.08±0.38 E-14 8.33±0.62 E-14 
Iron 3.00±0.37 E-14 6.46±0.56 E-14 3.33±4.01 E-14 5.36±0.51 E-14 
5Table 3.  Gamma-ray FOM Detection responses 
Gamma Detection FOM 
For Both Detector Assemblies 
Pallets 
No DU With DU 
Empty 13.18 ± 0.16 31.17 ± 0.25 
Celotex 13.16 ± 0.16 33.24 ± 0.32 
Borated 
Polyethylene 
16.03 ± 0.22 16.14 ± 0.21 
Polyethylene 12.06 ± 0.16 14.98 ± 0.18 
Wood 12.27 ± 0.15 21.14 ± 0.21 
Lead 13.56 ± 0.17 13.84 ± 0.18 
Iron 15.22 ± 0.20 14.80 ± 0.19 
6. Summary 
A photonuclear-based inspection technology, 
referred to as the PPA technology, is being 
developed and sponsored by the Department of 
Homeland Security for the detection of shielded 
nuclear material in air-, rail-, and maritime-cargo 
containers. Using a representative nuclear material 
(4.8-kg DU) and some well-defined shielding 
configurations positioned within the center of a 
selected cargo container inspection configuration, 
the PPA technology with its integrated neutron and 
gamma-ray detection capability did successfully 
detect the nuclear material whenever it was present.  
These results are very encouraging since it is 
anticipated that the detection capability will further 
improve when the pallets are actually loaded in their 
normal positions along the cargo container side, 
hence, effectively decreasing the DU-to-detector 
distances.  
The neutron detection capability correctly 
detected the nuclear material in all pallet scenarios, 
except the Borated Polyethylene and Polyethylene 
Pallet cases, with no false positive responses.  The 
simple gamma ray-detection capability correctly 
showed positive nuclear material detection in all 
scenarios but the Lead Pallet case when DU was 
present.  For the latter case, detection is observed 
when integrating the neutron-based detection data.  
However, the gamma ray data did also provide false 
positive detections with the Borated Polyethylene 
and Iron Pallet cases.  It should be noted that these 
two pallet cases are representative of very 
significant neutron attenuation/absorbing scenarios 
that should probably justify some additional 
inspection attention anyway, such as with 
radiographic imaging.  Additional work is needed to 
better characterize the simple gamma-ray detection 
system, to develop detection responses for off-
beam- axis locations, and to characterize multiple 
“calibration” pallet loading configurations. 
Acknowledgments 
The authors’ want to thank Dr. Calvin Moss 
from the Los Alamos National Laboratory for his 
technical collaborative support of this work. 
References 
[1] J.L. Jones, et. al., “Photofission-based, Nuclear Material 
Detection: Technology Demonstration,” INL Report 02-
01406, December 2002. 
[2] J.L. Jones, et. al., “Pulsed Photonuclear Assessment (PPA) 
Technique: CY04 Year-end Progress Report,” INL Report 
05-02583, February 2005. 
[3] J.L. Jones, et. al., “Pulsed Photoneutron Interrogation: The 
GNT Demonstration System,” INL/WINCO Report 94-
1225, October 1994. 
